Russia’s warfare is brutal, and its own losses in soldiers and material are immense. How long will Russia’s reserves last? Military economist Marcus Keupp assesses the situation.
The Russian army is not sparing the lives of its own soldiers or the increasingly scarce material in the war against Ukraine. The Kremlin is compensating for this increasing weakness by exploiting old fears of an overpowering Russia in the West, analyses Marcus Keupp.
In the interview, the military economist explains why he thinks Russian threats to the West are hot air, how Russia is short of material and how the Western states can demonstrate strength.
t-online: Mr. Keupp, when will Russia run out of soldiers and material in the war against Ukraine?
Marcus Keupp: Russia is already being stingy with material – at least at the moment. It can be observed that the Russian army is using less of it, at least on the front where it is moving forward. That would be the front from Kostiantynivka to Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region. It is mainly the infantry that is moving there, and Russia is sending its soldiers on “meat attacks” in which they run against the Ukrainian positions, largely without material support. This is extremely costly for Russia, but Putin is obviously hoping for something from it.
The Kremlin will use this type of warfare as long as it has an effect: Putin wants to spread sheer fear, among Ukrainians, yes, but also among people in the West, to whom the media keeps showing these terrifying images. The Kremlin can currently recruit enough new soldiers to replace those killed in “flesh attacks”.
But how long will the stocks of tanks and other material last? You once suggested that October 2023 would be the date by which Russia would have strategically lost the war.
Putin can no longer afford massive losses. When asked when Russia will run out of material, Osint analysts (Open Source Intelligence, editor’s note) have calculated different estimates: the optimistic ones assume the end of 2025, the pessimistic ones the end of 2027. All of this under the assumption that the current rate of attrition remains. So far, Russia has been burning through its material mercilessly. Time is definitely working against Putin and his regime. In fact, October 2023 was the point at which the situation for Russia deteriorated dramatically – because the operational reserve had already been almost completely destroyed by then.
Marcus Matthias Keuppborn in 1977, is a lecturer in military economics at the Military Academy of ETH Zurich. In his research, the habilitated business economist investigates classic military economic questions and also deals with the security of supplies and critical infrastructure. In 2019, his book “Military economics“, which is now also available in English and French. His book “Changing lanes: The world after Russia’s war“.
But Russia’s warehouses were still well stocked with tanks, albeit with older and ancient models?
That is the crucial point. Russia is living off its reserves from the Soviet era, it is producing too few tanks given the rate of wear and tear and is also repairing too few damaged ones. That is why ancient T-72s and T-62s are rolling towards the front. Russian equipment is getting older and worse. If Russia continues this type of warfare and continues to sacrifice equipment, then the Russian army will actually be pretty much empty-handed by the end of 2027.
How do you assess the current developments at the front?
This war alternates between phases of attrition and movement. At the moment there is more movement, both sides are trying to achieve something. The Russians are trying to move to where the Ukrainian defensive front is weakest. This is the aforementioned front arc from Kostiantynivka to Pokrovsk. Why is the defensive front so weak there? Because Ukraine actually made a tactical error, because it assumed that it would be able to hold Avdiivka. If the Russians break through now, they will encounter relatively few obstacles in the downstream phase. In the south, things are looking better for Ukraine, the Russians are constantly attacking the Zaporizhzhia front, but have not yet achieved any breakthroughs.
But how likely is a breakthrough by the Russian army in the north?
The Ukrainians are now improvising by building new defensive positions in the hinterland and using the topography of the terrain to delay the Russian advance. How successful all this will be remains to be seen. The Russians’ “flesh attacks” are extremely costly, they claim an enormous number of casualties and are very slow to boot, but Russia is advancing there.
Now the Ukrainian army has occupied Russian territory in Kursk. Doesn’t that tie up troops that are urgently needed for defense?
