This is worrying, after all, in their books they emphasize that Russia is particularly targeting Germany.
In Russia you have a very cool, clear view of Europe. You know exactly who is the strongest economic power, you also know that Germany has comparatively solid state finances. If someone has space to maneuver, then Germany. Russian thinking around Europe had a lot to do with Germany as early as the 20th century, that has not changed. The consideration is clear: if Russia has an impact in Berlin, then it also has influence in Europe.
What in turn explains the subversive activities of Russia in Germany?
Moscow wants to expand contradictions in Germany, it is looking for actors in Germany with whom you can work and who operate a parallel foreign policy. The government that does not like the Kremlin should be undermined. That is what Putin wants: an absolutely Russian -friendly government, a government that does what Moscow wants. Putin has been trying to set up such a system of satellite regimes for a long time everywhere in the post -Soviet area.
Now – strictly speaking – such a Russia -friendly government also in Washington, DC
The fact that Tulsi Gabbard became an American secret service is for Moscow as if Christmas, Easter and the Defender of the Fatherland fall for one day. Together with Trump’s fundamental attitude and Russia mostly uncritically -minded, the other government team, which was for Putin, was the jackpot.
However, the states through which they have traveled west are not very Russia -friendly, as they describe in their book “Eisige silence downstream”: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
If you have overcome the border from Russia into the EU after some difficulties, you quickly find out in Estonia and Latvia that nobody actually maintains a relaxed relationship with Russia. Most of them combine a feeling of threat or a personal family suffering with Russia. Significant parts of the Estonian and Latvian population have been deported in the Soviet Union, so many people died. This memory continues in all three Baltic states because Russia is often marched in because Russia still interferes.
The Russian minority living in the Baltic States is the corresponding key?
In addition, there are also the so -called passeless, ethnic Russians, whom Moscow would like to exhibit Russian passes. In the Baltic States, we are dealing with a very intricate nationality policy. This has to deal with these countries, for Moscow it is the perfect lever to create unrest. Resistance takes place by having in fact issue an entry ban for Russians.
You also visited the Kaliningrad Oblast, with the former Königsberg as the center. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant once lived there. How is the situation there?
From Moscow’s point of view, the relationship with Kaliningrad was rather distant: a piece of Germany that had been taken, culturally far away, but an ideal fleet base and a maneuver area. That is why you couldn’t do little with Kant at first. This has changed significantly, and recently Kaliningrad has been an excellent tourist region with beautiful beaches. There is also the breathtaking Curonian Spit there. As the old Prussian beach baths are trimmed by conversions to “Russian”, this should also happen with Immanuel Kant.
In the Seven Years’ War, Königsberg had been occupied by Russian troops for several years. This is now used to declare Kant as actually Russian philosophers. I actually met some people in Kaliningrad who vehemently justify why Kant would have thought much more Russian than German. At the same time, Kant is used for all kinds of tourist kitsch.
What scenarios do you think in Russia’s confrontation with the West?
I currently see three scenarios. First of all, Russia could march through in Ukraine and take the victory away. Then Moscow would quickly make further claims, for example towards Moldau. At the same time, Putin would increase political pressure in Europe to make demands and to gain other allies. This scenario is also associated with the possibility that Russia devours Estonia and then threatens to see the atomic bomb to see how far Article 5 of the NATO contract is really enough.
That sounds like “Worst Case” …
We come to the second scenario. Russia will lose this war in it. And I would like to emphasize at this point: Nuclear powers can also take defeats. Again and again I hear this nonsense that Russia is a nuclear power and therefore cannot lose a war. This is total nonsense, which comes from the specific German experience with the unconditional surrender in 1945. We are the special path, unconditional capitulations are an exceptional appearance in world history.
The forces of the nuclear Soviet Union finally had to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989.
This is an example, yes. Let’s look at the current situation: Actually, Putin is miserable in Ukraine, I like to make the bill on: Josef Stalin came from Stalingrad to Berlin in almost four years. In the comparable time Putin just made it from Donetsk to the suburbs of Pokrowsk. For Putin – with alleviation – this is a crashing defeat. Why all of this? What for the over one million of crippled and killed men? Putin will have to explain that at home. The propaganda will somehow put it on, but in memory it will stick to Putin.
Did you mention a third scenario?
This moves between the other two: Russia will make even smaller regional gains, but will no longer be able to conquer Ukraine’s big city. It will not win, but will also be active there in the future. The demarcation line in Ukraine will be an unclear, insecure for many, many years. Accordingly, Ukraine will not be able to develop too full of bloom, and its admission to the EU and NATO will also be difficult because of the open conflict with Russia.
Do you have advice as a historian?
In fact, the story usually has no solutions. History only offers many examples of developments that are the transition, transition to something new. That’s why I think the third scenario is the most likely.
Mr. Thumann, thank you very much for the conversation.
